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If promotion in a hierarchy is based on a random signal of ability, rates of promotion will be affected
by risk-taking. Further, the numbers and abilities of risk-takers and non-risk-takers will be different
at each stage of the hierarchy, and the ratio will be changing. I show that, under mild conditions,
more risk-takers than non-risk-takers will survive at early stages, but they will have lower ability.
At later stages, this will be reversed: Fewer risk-takers than non-risk-takers survive, but they will
have higher ability. I give several interpretations for how these theorems relate to affirmative action,
in light of considerable evidence that males are more risk-taking than females.
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This paper studies the eﬀect of risk-taking in hierarchies, where promotion at each
stage depends on a signal of ability. The motivation for the paper comes from a
substantial body of evidence that males are more risk-taking than females, and from
the continuing controversy about why males and females have diﬀerent patterns of
success in labor markets. Granting the premise that the genders diﬀer in risk-taking,
the question is whether it has explanatory power for labor markets. The answer is
mixed.
The theorems proved below compare promotions drawn from two subpopula-
tions, one of which generates accurate signals of ability and the other of which gener-
ates noisy signals of ability. The premise is that true abilities (which may be deﬁned
diﬀerently in diﬀerent hierarchies) have the same distribution in both populations, but
that agents in one population give a noisy signal to the decision maker. This is a
reduced-form hypothesis which might follow from preferences and optimizing behav-
ior, or might reﬂect behavior that is hard-wired. This distinction does not matter for
the theorems that I prove, although it may matter for the interpretation.
The main point of the paper is to understand how promotion plays out for the
two populations in a hierarchy with a large (inﬁnite) number of stages. The main
conclusion is that what happens at the beginning of the hierarchy is inverted at the
end. Risk-taking will boost the number of survivors in the ﬁrst round of elimination,
relative to the non-risk-takers, at least under plausible conditions. But although the
risk-takers will be overrepresented at stage 2, they will have lower ability on average
than the underrepresented survivors who did not take risks.
Moving up the hierarchy, the distributions of abilities and promotion rates are
both changing. At stage 2, the mean ability of risk-takers is lower than of non-risk-
takers, but this eventually switches back. At the end of the (inﬁnite) hierarchy, the
mean ability of risk-takers is higher than the mean ability of non-risk-takers, but they
will be underrepresented. The reason for the switch is that, at every stage, every
surviving risk-taker has another opportunity to throw himself randomly out of the
pool. As the hierarchy progresses, the cumulative eﬀe c ti st h a to n l yt h ev e r y ,v e r y
1able risk-takers survive. There are not very many of them, relative to non-risk-takers.
The theorems that underlie these assertions are proven in section 3, where I also
draw out the contradictions among the three promotion objectives of (a) promoting
according to equal standards, (b) promoting equal numbers, and (c) promoting to
ensure equal average abilities. Before getting to the main content, section 2 says
more about the literature on risk-taking that motivates this inquiry.
2. Risk-Taking and Promotion in a Hierarchy
There is considerable evidence that males are more risk-taking than females. In
particular, see Eckel and Grossman (2005a). Their own experiments (2002) show that
males and females have diﬀerent gambling behavior. In other experiments (2005b)
they show not only that females are more risk averse, but that other agents (not just
researchers on gender) perceive this to be true. Eckel and Grossman (2005a) argue
that the evidence on a discrepancy in risk-taking is especially strong in “ﬁeld studies”
(natural experiments such as observing behavior in placing bets), but less conclusive
in “contextual environmental” experiments such as experiments involving insurance
choices. One of the most interesting risk-taking contexts is investment. In a study
that used measures of risk tolerance reported in the Wall Street Journal, and measures
of personality traits developed by psychologists, Stanford and Vellenga (2002) found
that males have much higher risk tolerance than females. Jianakoplos and Bernasek
(1998) came to the same conclusion by observing investment portfolios. Much of the
experimental evidence comes from disciplines other than economics. For example,
psychologists Ginsburg et al (2002) observed children at a zoo in contexts where the
children could choose to engage in a risky activity or not. They concluded strongly
that young boys were much more inclined to put themselves at risk than young girls.
Many scholars have suggested evolutionary arguments for the discrepancy in
risk-taking behavior. For example, Dekel and Scotchmer (1999) postulated that males
play “winner-take-all” games, and explored a precise sense in which such games do
(or do not) lead to riskier behavior. The premise in that paper, which is also the
easiest interpretation of the model below, is that such behavior is genetically coded.
2Unraveling the nature/nurture issue is obviously diﬃcult, but not necessary for the
arguments below.
Aﬃrmative action policies have been justiﬁed and evaluated on both eﬃciency
grounds and equity grounds. For the most part, economists have focussed on eﬃciency,
especially productive eﬃciency. For example, Holzer and Neumark (2000) argue from
an extensive empirical literature that “aﬃrmative action oﬀers signiﬁcant redistribu-
tion toward women and minorities, with relatively small eﬃciency consequences” (page
559). Among the ingenious theoretical arguments for why aﬃrmative action policies
enhance eﬃciency are those of Lundberg and Startz (1983) and Lundberg (1991), who
consider a model of statistical discrimination where wages depend on imperfect signals
of ability. They show, among other things, that if workers with diﬀerent signaling
ability are pooled, there is more incentive to invest in human capital. Milgrom and
Oster (1987) argue that aﬃrmative action policies can eﬃciently prevent employers
from underpromoting women and minorities. The incentive to underpromote derives
from a fear of revealing the worth of their employees to rival ﬁrms, a threat which is
higher for the more “invisible” workers, such as women and minorities.
In this paper I take a diﬀerent view of both labor markets and aﬃrmative
action. I consider labor market hierarchies, in which promotion to stage t requires
prior promotion to stage t−1. I take investments in human capital as exogenous, and
assume that wages at each stage of the hierarchy are immutable. My focus is entirely
on rates of promotion and whether the “right” workers are promoted, if the objective
is to select on ability.
Examples of such hierarchies might be
• law, where law students are promoted to associates in law ﬁrms, associates are
promoted to partner, and some partners eventually become judges;
• the executive hierarchy of corporations;
• academic life where undergraduates are promoted to graduate student, gradu-
ate students are promoted to assistant professor, and assistant professors are
promoted to full professor.
3The modern legal environment prohibits discrimination in labor practices. How-
ever, discrimination is hard to deﬁne. Figure 1 shows that the following three objec-
tives are pairwise inconsistent:
• equal promotion standards
• equal numbers of promotions
• promotion of a pool of agents with equal average ability.
In Figure 1, the distribution of true ability a is shown by density g.T h e
distribution of true ability is assumed to be the same in both populations, a risk-
taking population (say, males) and a risk-averse population (say, females). The density
˜ g represents the distribution of signals that the risk-taking population will generate,
when their true ability a is confounded by noise. The signal of a random male will be
σ = a + u,w h e r ea is his true ability, and u is distributed according to a cumulative
distribution function φ with mean zero.
Consider the ﬁrst round of the promotion hierarchy. Suppose that the promo-
tion standard for males is c. That is, every male who generates a signal above c is
promoted. The other promotion standards are for females: The promotion standard
fe will ensure that females are promoted with the same probability as males, and the
promotion standard fa will ensure that the expected ability of promoted females is
t h es a m ea st h a to fp r o m o t e dm a l e s . If the promotion policy is gender blind, then
females are also promoted according to the standard c.
If males and females are treated equally in the sense of being promoted accord-
i n gt ot h es a m es t a n d a r dc, then (provided that fewer than half are promoted)
• more males than females are promoted; and
• the females have higher ability on average.
The latter is for two reasons: more men than women are promoted, and some
of them are mistakes.
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Figure 1. First Stage of the Hierarchy
The gender-blind policy is clearly inhospitable to females at the ﬁrst stage,
however reasonable it may seem from a procedural point of view. Consider instead an
“aﬃrmative action” policy to promote equal numbers of males and females. Then the
promotion standard for females must clearly be lower than for males, in particular,
fe. Even so,
• under an aﬃrmative action program to promote equal numbers of males and
females, promoted females will on average have higher ability than promoted
males.
Is this “fair?” An aﬃrmative action policy aimed at equal numbers is still
inhospitable to females in the sense that, on average, promoted females have higher
ability than promoted males. Their superior ability is due to the fact that, in pro-
moting males, mistakes are made in both directions. Low-ability males are promoted,
and high-ability males are excluded. Females could reasonably argue that the system
should impose an even lower bar for females, in order to remedy the discrepancy in
average (and marginal) ability.
Consider then an aﬃrmative action policy aimed at ensuring equal ability of
both promoted groups, instead of equal numbers.T h e n
• under an aﬃrmative action goal of promoting females with the same expected
ability as males, fewer males than females will be promoted; and
5• the standard for female promotion should be lower than for males, and even
lower than the one than ensures equal numbers.
The much lower promotion standard for females is a bit paradoxical: it appears
to favor females of lower ability than males, but in fact the females have higher ability
on average. A higher standard must be applied to males in order to compensate for
the mistakes.
The graphical discussion only illuminates the ﬁrst stage of promotion. The
question, however, is what happens in subsequent stages of the hierarchy, as the dis-
tribution of abilities in the pool changes. At the second stage, some high-ability males
have been eliminated due to randomness, and some low-ability males remain. With
a gender-blind policy, the males may still have an advantage at stage two due to the
new draw of noise that will boost some of them above the bar. However, at stage
two, there is a countervailing eﬀect. The boost due to noise must be strong enough to
overcome the higher ability of the remaining females. At some point in the hierarchy,
ability will dominate noise, and males will no longer be promoted in higher numbers.
Fewer and fewer males are promoted, but in yet another switch-around, at much later
stages of the hierarchy, the only males that remain are those with very high ability
who survived their many opportunities to be eliminated.
The theorems that follow, which are the main content of the paper, can be
interpreted in several ways. I return to these various interpretations in section 4.
3. The Hierarchy
Each agent’s ability, denoted a ∈ R, is drawn independently from a distribution G
with density g. Index the agents by i =1 ,.... An agent i generates a signal of ability
σi
t ∈ R in period t. If the agent i is female, we assume that σi
t = ai (the signal
is nonrandom). If the agent i is a male, σi
t = ai + ui
t, where the random noise ui
t
is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function φ with mean zero and
positive variance, and the random draws of noise in diﬀerent stages of the hierarchy
are independent. The designations “male” and “female” refer to the riskiness of the
signals that are produced. This analysis would obviously apply to any two groups
6that diﬀer in the randomness of their signals. In that sense, the designations male
and female are only illustrative, and can even be reversed (see below).
Promotion standards are sequences {mt}t=1...,{ft}t=1.... A male agent i survives
to stage t if σi
d ≥ md for each d ≤ t,a n daf e m a l ea g e n ti survives to stage t if ai ≥ fd
for each d ≤ t. We say that the promotion standards are gender-blind if there is a
sequence {ct} such that mt = ft = ct for each t.
For females, we can assume without loss of generality that the promotion stan-
dards are nondecreasing. If at any point a higher cutoﬀ is followed by a lower cutoﬀ,
that is, ft+1 <f t, then ft+1 can be replaced by ft with no consequence. All the agents
with ability between ft+1 and ft have in any case been eliminated at stage t. We will
thus assume that {ft} is nondecreasing. Then a female survives to stage t if a ≥ ft
and does not survive otherwise. Hence the probability that a random female survives
to stage t is Z ∞
ft
g(a)da (3.1)
Am a l ew i t ha b i l i t ya survives to stage t if a + ud >m d for all d ≤ t. Hence the





d=1(1 − φ(md − a))da (3.2)


















d=1(1 − φ(md − a)) R ∞
−∞ g(a)Πt
d=1(1 − φ(md − a))da
da (3.4)
We use the following assumptions, which are assumed throughout.
1. The distribution G is symmetric,2 strictly increasing, has a density g that is
strictly quasiconcave and continuous, and has the real line as support.
2For all x in the support, G(x)=1− G(−x).
72. The distribution φ is symmetric and strictly increasing with zero mean and
support the real line.
We begin with two lemmas. The intuition for the ﬁrst lemma is that the
promoted males include mistakes in both directions. Lower-ability males are promoted
by mistake, and higher-ability males are excluded by mistake. Since no mistakes are
made in promoting females, the only way to ensure that promoted males have as high
ability as females is to promote fewer of them. At the ﬁrst stage, promoting fewer of
them will require that females have a lower promotion standard. At later stages, after
males have been eliminated in previous promotion stages, a lower promotion standard
for males can still be consistent with fewer promotions or higher ability.
Lemma 3.1. Let {mt} ,{ft} be the promotion standards. The expected ability of a
random surviving male is lower than the expected ability of a random surviving female
at any stage t at which males have at least as high a probability of survival.
Proof: With a change of variables, y = a − ft, the females’ expected ability




g (ft + y) R ∞
0 g (ft + y)dy




g (ft + y) R ∞
0 g (ft + y)dy
dy (3.5)
For males, with a change of variables y = a−ft, the expected ability conditional





d=1(1 − φ(md − ft − y)) R ∞
−∞ g(ft + y)Πt







d=1(1 − φ(md − ft − y)) R ∞
−∞ g(ft + y)Πt
d=1(1 − φ(md − ft − y))dy
dy (3.6)
It holds that (3.5) is greater than (3.6) if the following inequality holds for
y ≥ 0:
g(ft + y)Πt
d=1(1 − φ(md − ft − y)) R ∞
−∞ g(ft + y)Πt
d=1(1 − φ(md − ft − y))dy
<
g (ft + y) R ∞
0 g(ft + y)dy
Since g(ft + y)Πt
d=1(1 − φ(md − ft − y)) ≤ g (ft + y), (3.5) is greater than
(3.6) if the denominator of the lefthand side is no smaller than the denominator of
8the righthand side. The denominators are the probabilities that a male or female
survives, respectively. ¤
In the next lemma, the ﬁrst part reﬂects the fact that, regardless of the promo-
tion standards, each male has positive probability of being eliminated at each stage.
Since excluded agents cannot re-enter the pool, only few males will survive in the long
run.
The second part reﬂects the fact that, regardless of the promotion standards,
only the males with very high ability will survive many opportunities to be eliminated.
Thus, in the “long run”, it does not matter very much what the promotion standards
are, as long as there is a possibility to be eliminated at each stage. Males that survive
will likely have very high ability. In contrast, a female will survive with probability
one if her ability is above the maximum promotion standard. This means that more
females survive in the long run, even without extraordinary ability.
Lemma 3.2. Let {mt},{ft} be promotion standards that are bounded above and
below. Then
(1) Given ε > 0, there exists ˜ t such that for t>˜ t, the probability that a male survives
to stage t is less than ε;a n d
(2) There exists ˆ t such that for t>ˆ t, the expected ability of a surviving male is larger
than the expected ability of a surviving female.
Proof: Let m =i n f {mt},¯ m =s u p {mt},f =i n f {ft}, ¯ f =s u p {ft}.
(1) Let ε > 0. Let ˜ a>0 satisfy 0 < 1 − G(˜ a) < ε/2a n dl e t˜ t satisfy
φ(a − m)
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Let 1 > δ > 0. Let ˜ a>0s a t i s ﬁy −˜ a − m < ˜ a − ¯ m and ¯ af
1−δ < ˜ a. Let ˆ a satisfy
˜ a − m < ˆ a − ¯ m Let ˆ t be such that for t>ˆ t
¯ af
1 − δ
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For t>ˆ t, female ability (3.3) is less than male ability (3.4). ¤
I use these lemmas to characterize the consequences of gender-blind promotion
standards.
Proposition 3.3. (Gender Blind Promotions) Suppose that the promotion standards
are gender blind and that c1 >E G(a),G (ct) < 1 for all t. Then
( 1 )A tt h eﬁrst stage, if c1 >E G(a), a random male has a higher probability of survival
than a random female, and a random surviving female will have higher expected ability
than a random surviving male.
(2) At later stages, t>˜ t for some appropriate ˜ t, the probability that a random male
survives is smaller than the probability a random female survives, but the expected
ability of surviving males is larger than the expected ability of surviving females.
Proof: (1) At stage 1, the probability (3.2) that a male survives can be
written as follows with a change of variables x = a − c1, and using symmetry of φ :
Z ∞
−∞














g(c1 − x)φ(−x)dx +
Z ∞
0




[g(c1 − x) − g(c1 + x)φ(−x)dx +
Z ∞
0





11The inequality holds because
R ∞
0 [g(c1 −x)− g(c1 +x)φ(−x)dx > 0 due to the
strict quasiconcavity and symmetry of g and c1 >E g(a). Hence (3.2) is larger than
(3.1) at t =1 . Using Lemma 3.1, the expected ability of a surviving male is lower
than the expected ability of a surviving female.
(2) follows directly from Lemma 3.2 by choosing ε > 0 such that (1−G(f)) > ε.
¤
We now turn to alternative policy goals. We ﬁrst consider the goal of equalizing
the probabilities of promotion at each stage, and then consider the goal of equalizing
the average ability of the survivors at each stage.
It follows directly from Lemma 3.2(1) that bounded sequences {mt},{ft} cannot
have the property that males and females have the same probability of promotion at
all stages. Part (2) of the following proposition points out that it is impossible to
equalize promotion rates with a nondecreasing sequence of promotion standards for
males, and in fact, the sequence cannot be bounded below. A nondecreasing sequence
of promotion standards would be the natural interpretation of a promotion hierarchy.
In order to promote equal numbers of males and females, females must be favored at
early stages of the hierarchy, and males must be favored at later stages of the hierarchy,
in terms of the promotion standard.
Proposition 3.4. (Promoting Equal Numbers) Let {mt},{ft} be promotion stan-
dards such that males and females have the same probability of promotion at each
stage t.
(1) If f1,m 1 >E G(a),t h e nf1 <m 1 (the promotion standard for females is lower than
for males at stage 1).
(2) If the sequence {ft} converges to a ﬁnite limit, then the sequence {mt} is not
bounded below.
Proof: (1) follows from Proposition 3.3(1), which implies that if m1 = f1,
males have a higher probability of survival than females. Since the probability of
survival is decreasing in m1, the probabilities can only be equal if m1 >f 1.
(2) Since {ft} converges, the sequence of female survival rates {1−G(ft)}t=1,...
also converges, and the sequence of male survival rates {
R ∞
−∞ g(a)Πt
d=1(1 − φ(md −
12a))da}t=1,... converges to the same limit, say L.C h o o s e a n ε > 0 such that ε <L .
Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that {mt} is bounded below by m. The ,male









g(a)(1 − φ(m − a))
tda (3.8)
Choose ˜ a,ˆ a such that ˆ a<˜ a and
1 − G(˜ a) < ε/3
G(ˆ a) < ε/3
Choose ˆ t such that (1 − φ(m − ˜ a))
ˆ t < ε/3. Then if t>ˆ t, the upper bound on the
male survival rate at stage t, (3.8), can be written
Z ˆ a
−∞


















< ε/3+( 1− φ(m − ˜ a))
t + ε/3 < ε <L
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Proposition 3.5. (Promoting Equal Average Ability) (1) Suppose that the expected
abilities of surviving males and females are the same at stage t under the promotion
standards {mt},{ft} . Then the survival rate of females at stage t must be greater than
that of males. (2) There are no bounded sequences of promotion standards {mt},{ft}
for which promoted males have the same average ability as promoted females at each
t.
Proof: The probability densities of females’ and males abilities, conditional





d=1(1 − φ(md − a)) R ∞
−∞ g(a)Πt
d=1(1 − φ(md − a))da
(3.10)
(1) Suppose to the contrary that (3.2) is at least as great as (3.1). Thus
the denominator of (3.10) is at least as great as the denominator of (3.9). Since
Πt
d=1(1 − φ(md − a)) < 1a te a c ht, it follows that the density (3.10) is smaller than
t h ef e m a l ed e n s i t y( 3 . 9 )a te a c ha ∈ (ft,∞). The remaining density for males is on
abilities lower than the minimum ability for females, ft. Hence the expected ability
for females is higher than that for males, a contradiction.
(2) Lemma 3.2(2) shows that, for any bounded sequences, the average ability
of surviving males is higher than the average ability of surviving females for late stages
of the hierarchy (large t). ¤
4. Interpretations
Some of these conclusions can be noticed empirically and others cannot. At most we
can observe promotion rules, signals, and proportions promoted, but we cannot in
general observe true abilities.
Of course there is the additional problem of identifying hierarchies that have
adhered to a particular promotion policy despite the legal and political challenges
of the past several decades. It is also hard to identify hierarchies where the same
proportions of women and men have wanted to stay in the pool. Instead, women
and men drop out at diﬀerent rates for self-motivated reasons such as child bearing.
Nevertheless, I point out two conclusions that would be empirically consistent with
this model if data were available:
1. Under a gender-blind promotion policy, the ratio of surviving females to surviv-
ing males at early stages of the hierarchy should be smaller than in the original
population, but should be larger at later stages of the hierarchy. The proportion
of females that survive in the limit should exceed their proportion in the original
population.
2. Under an equal-abilities promotion policy, the ratio of surviving females to sur-
viving males should be increasing with time, and should be greater at every t
14than in the original population.
The hypotheses that males generate riskier signals than females, and that the
two groups start from identical distributions of ability, can both be challenged. It is
thus worth commenting on how this model changes under alternative hypotheses.
First, instead of assuming that males and females have the same distribution of
abilities, assume that males have the same mean ability as females, but greater vari-
ance. This is also a “riskiness” hypothesis, but one that characterizes the populations
rather than behavior. The model can be thought of as one in which males get a single
draw of random noise, which persists throughout their working lives. Or, instead
of being independent, the draws of random noise in successive periods are perfectly
correlated.
With independent draws of random noise, a promoted male is always in jeop-
ardy of being excluded by a subsequent draw, and that is why the survival rate of
males is smaller than that of females in the long run. With perfectly correlated
noise, the promoted male has no such fear. Like females, he can only drop out at a
subsequent stage if the promotion standard is raised. As a consequence, the initial
advantage described by Proposition 3.3(1) for gender-blind standards will persist, and
there will always be disproportionately many males in the pool, with lower average
ability than females.
This discrepancy could be remedied with a sequence of standards {ft},{mt}
that favor females, ft <m t for all t. If the higher signal generated by males is
interpreted as persistent noise, then such a program of aﬃrmative action would have
the dual beneﬁts of increasing the promotion of women and increasing the average
ability of people who are promoted. However if the higher signal generated by males
is due to the fact that males have higher variance in ability, and signals accurately
reﬂect ability, then the policy of aﬃrmative action would reduce the average ability
of people who are promoted.
The second alternative interpretation reverses the hypothesis about which group
generates risky signals. Again assume that the distributions of abilities are the same,
but instead of assuming that males generate risky signals, assume that females gener-
15ate risky signals. An explanation for this reversal might lie in a variant on the Milgrom
and Oster (1987) “invisibility” hypothesis: Neither the ability of males nor of females
is observable, but males generate more evidence about their true ability than females.
Thus when an observer views the signal at any stage of the hierarchy, interpreted as
some type of mean performance, he believes that he is observing a random variable
which is an unbiased estimator of the mean, but has higher variance for females than
males. For reasons that we will leave aside here, males may generate more evidence in
each hierarchical stage than females. Their abilities may be fully observable, whereas
the abilities of females are observable with noise.
If the hypothesis on riskiness of signals is reversed, then the interpretation of the
above propositions is reversed. Instead of being disfavored at the early stages of the
gender-blind hierarchy and favored in later stages, females are favored in early stages
and disfavored in later stages. In fact, Proposition 3.3(2) can then be interpreted as
the formalization of a 1970’s slogan: Women have to be “twice as good to get half as
far.”
5. Eﬃciency
The analysis above has been positive and not normative. I have described the paths
of promotions that would follow from various promotion standards. Of course the
motive behind aﬃrmative action is a normative one, namely, to redress the apparent
inequity of promoting more males than females. We now turn to whether there is an
“eﬃciency/equity” tradeoﬀ.
Eﬃciency is hard to deﬁne in a partial model of a labor market such as this. In
fact, since aﬃrmative action has many faces, its eﬃciency eﬀects are hard to identify
in general, as discussed by Holzer and Neumark (2000). I will think of eﬃciency as
being served by the promotion of the most able agents.
If the males’ signals were so random that the truth was mostly obscured, it
would probably be better to promote only females, for whom the ability is more
observable. This wisdom is particularly compelling if the number of agents required
at the next level of promotion is small relative to the pool, so that ability is not
16compromised by promoting enough females to ﬁll the slots. The main prescription
in this regard is given by Proposition 3.5, which points out that, if equal abilities
are desired in the promoted pool, more females than males must survive at every
stage. At early stages of the hierarchy, this should be accomplished by giving females
an aﬃrmative-action boost (Proposition 3.3(1)), and at later stages of the hierarchy,
equal abilities require that males get an aﬃrmative-action boost (Proposition 3.3(2)).
When the initial winnowing process promotes less than half the pool — captured
in the hypothesis that the promotion standard is on the downward sloping part of the
density function — females will initially be disadvantaged under a gender-blind policy.
However their disadvantage will be overcome at later stages. The disadvantage is
self-rectifying. However, both the early-stage inequities and late-stage inequities are
ineﬃcient. A better policy would be to increase the promotion of females at the early
stages, e..g, by giving them a lower promotion standard (“aﬃrmative action”), and to
increase the promotion of males at later stages, also by tinkering with the promotion
standard. This remedy will not be implemented by promoting equal numbers. With
equal numbers, according to Lemma 3.1, promoted males are less able than promoted
females at all stages.
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